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Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 25, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair  
Anthony LakeOVP  
Leon Fuerth  
Rick SaundersState  
Secretary Christopher  
Peter Tarnoff  
Richard Holbrooke  
Robert GallucciDOD  
Dr. William Perry  
James PardewUSUN  
Amb. Madeleine Albright  
(via secure video)  
David SchefferCIA  
Dennis Blair  
Raymond ConverseJCS  
General Shalikashvili  
Wesley ClarkWhite House  
Sandy Berger  
Nancy SoderbergNSC  
Sandy Vershbow  
John Feeley  
Don KerrickSummary of ConclusionsSanctions Relief

1. Principals agreed to postpone until the next PC meeting a final decision on the negotiator's proposal for suspension of sanctions against Serbia during the proximity talks. (S)

IFOR: Unresolved Issues

2. Principals approved the recommendations contained in the Deputies Committee Memorandum to Principals of October 24, 1995

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Classified by: Andrew Sens

Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)

Declassify on: 10/28/15 (x4)

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(Tab B), where Deputies had reached agreement on issues pertaining to the mission of the Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR).

3. During subsequent discussion about the possibility of establishing cantonment areas for the parties' military forces, the Principals decided to reexamine the issue of a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone, while reaffirming their approval of a 4-km all-weapons-free zone along the inter-entity boundary (see summary of conclusions for October 27 Principals Committee meeting).

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1995

## MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: IFOR Issues

This memorandum summarizes the conclusions of the Deputies Committee on a range of issues pertaining to the mission of the Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR). It includes issues on which Deputies reached agreement (Section A) and issues for which a Principals' decision is needed (Section B). The numbers in parentheses refer to the questions in the JCS paper "IFOR Issues" of October 23, 1995.

A. AGREED ISSUES

What is the IFOR's mission?

The primary tasks of the IFOR, as set forth in SACEUR's concept of operations, are:

- Assume command of the theater and immediately establish robust C2 capability;
- Establish the IFOR rapidly, building on in-place forces and limited early deployments followed by rapid introduction of substantial follow-on force;
- Control withdrawal of non-transferred UNPROFOR forces in coordination with IFOR deployment;
- Protect the force and ensure self defense and freedom of movement for the IFOR;
- Establish, monitor and enforce compliance with the military terms of the peace agreement in B-H. For now they specifically include:
  - establish an immediate reaction force;
  - mark the internal lines and areas of separation between the parties, monitor, and if necessary enforce, the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed upon period;
  - establish and monitor a zone of separation;

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Classified by: Samuel R. Berger

Reason: 1.5 (a) (b) (d)

Declassify on: 10/24/15 (X4)

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- if necessary, assume responsibility for the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces;
- employ NATO air forces as part of the IFOR;
- employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR.
- These missions are subject to review, revision and/or expansion based on the terms of the peace settlement.

What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep? (Q1)

- Language in the Framework Agreement should clearly state that IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement, as defined in the military annex. The IFOR will carry out its mission in coordination with civilian organizations (such as OSCE, EU, and the UN) which will implement the non-military aspects of the agreement.

How does SICOR interact with IFOR if there is a violation? (Q5)

- The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) has no authority over IFOR. However, to the extent practical, the IFOR commander will maintain liaison with the SICOR. SACEUR, or his designee, can deal directly with civilians heads of each entity concerning military matters and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.

What is the relationship of the IFOR to the civilian police?  
What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle? (Q6,8)

- IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions (e.g. crimes, property issues, civil order).
- The Framework Agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist governments and populations in developing local police forces.
- See unresolved issues (Section B) with respect to the U.S. role in organizing civilian police efforts

Will IFOR stop attacks on UN or other international civilian agencies and their workers? (Q7)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations.

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- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against international civilian agencies where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- IFOR will not provide routine protection for relief convoys and civilian movement, but, if such convoys are attacked, the commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence where NATO forces are present or have a means and opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to attacks in areas that are "over the horizon."

What will IFOR do about attacks on indigenous civilians, atrocities and human rights violations? (Q3A, 7A, 9, 9A)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations.
- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against indigenous civilians, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian rights violations and where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to gross violations of human rights in areas that are "over the horizon."

What, if anything, will IFOR do about election security? (Q12)

- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement.
- The OSCE should be enlisted as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.
- IFOR will not have specific election security tasks.

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Under what circumstances will IFOR use force against violations of the peace agreement? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling a violation? (Q3, 3A, 4, 27)

- The IFOR commander is to implement and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement -- in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and establishment of agreed zones of separation.
- Forces which fire from one territory to another, into or across the zone of separation, or which probe, patrol, snipe, or violate the separation of forces agreement by moving regular or paramilitary forces into or through the zone, will be deemed in violation of the peace agreement. The IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.
- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance with the agreement. A major breakdown would warrant IFOR withdrawal.
- The U.S. will seek NAC approval of Rules of Engagement that provide the IFOR commander with broad authority for use of force in most contingencies without requiring additional NAC decisions.
- The IFOR commander can seek NAC guidance through SACEUR at key stages not covered by the initial ROE, such as major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, and/or disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or with other organizations that cannot be resolved in theater.

Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where territory changes control under the peace agreement from one warring faction to the other?

- The IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of refugees and displaced persons.
- Where territory is transferred by the peace agreement, IFOR will assure non-interference with population movements by military forces during the transfer, for a finite period of time.
- The UNHCR and other organizations will retain responsibility for: humanitarian assistance for the civilian population; permanent settlement of refugees and assistance for civilian population; permanent resettlement of refugees and displaced

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persons; dissemination of information to the public; and movement of populations across borders.

What is IFOR's responsibility to those indigenous civilians displaced in the past (i.e. before the peace agreement)?

- Although the peace agreement would confirm the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of these refugee populations.

Should we demand, as a precondition for IFOR deployment, that parties make tangible gestures of good faith ("indicators of seriousness") between initialing and signature of the peace agreement? (Q23)

- We should seek confidence-building measures in the framework agreement that parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement and deployment, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR. These could include:
  - continued cessation of hostilities and observance of the cease-fire;
  - no patrols forward of friendly force positions;
  - no firing of large-caliber weapons;
  - shut down of all air-early-warning and air-defense radars within 72 hours of initialing;
  - commencement of withdrawal by each party of its forces, military institutions, facilities and weapons from the zone of separation.
- If, however, conditions on the ground have deteriorated significantly by the time of signature, this could represent a withdrawal of strategic consent by the parties.

Does the IFOR remain in Bosnia for only 12 months? (Q28)

- The IFOR mission should have a finite duration. But until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration of the mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure.

Will the IFOR enforce implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly (i.e. including the use of force against Federation as well as Bosnian Serb forces in the event of violations of the agreement? (Q10)

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- IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement evenhandedly with regard to all parties.

Do we want a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone of separation and/or a 4-km all-weapons-free zone within the zone of separation? (Q14, 15)

- The framework agreement should include a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone adjusted to fit the demarcation of territory, and a 4-km all-weapons-free zone of separation.

Should the IFOR Headquarters be in Naples, Sarajevo or Zagreb? (Q20)

- The IFOR HQ will be in Sarajevo. The IFOR commander will determine when it is logistically feasible to locate the HQ in Sarajevo, and he is authorized to establish rear headquarters in Naples and Zagreb.

How will IFOR handle war criminals?

- It is not IFOR's mission to search and find war criminals.
- However, in the course of performing its mission, and where the opportunity presents itself, IFOR may apprehend war criminals.

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access? (Q16)

- IFOR will have free access into and within the Bosnian Serb entity, and will conduct regular patrols on the Serb side of the zone of separation.
- See unresolved issues (Section B) on nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory beyond free access and regular patrols.

#### B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" (out of IFOR's immediate presence) violations of the peace agreement or "over the horizon" reports of gross violations of human rights? (Q3A, 4, 7A)

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks or gross violations of

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human rights when they occur "over the horizon," i.e. in areas removed from IFOR areas of deployment.

- One view is that to ignore such a report could adversely affect the stability of the peace agreement and undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment, and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.
- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" reports of attacks on international civilian agencies?

*The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks against international civilian agencies when they occur "over the horizon."*

- One view is that to fail to act to protect international civilian personnel could undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would argue that an attack on an international agency that is implementing the civilian aspects of the settlement or supporting reconstruction efforts should command an immediate response from IFOR. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.
- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present and have the means and opportunity to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

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Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders of Bosnia, particularly the inter-Serb border? (Q11, 11A)

- One view is that the Bosnian Government will demand such a presence, and that a minimal IFOR presence will counter the perception of a partition.
- The other view is that the mission of such forces on the border is unclear, that their presence would increase the size of the force and increase the risk of hostage-taking, and that any border monitoring functions can be handled by civilian agencies.

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access and patrols within the zone of separation? (Q16)

*The issue is whether the IFOR mission should include being deployed regularly or, to some degree, stationed in Bosnian Serb territory.*

- One view is that such deployment or stationing of IFOR troops in Bosnian Serb territory will promote evenhandedness and credibility, deter violations of the agreement within the Serb entity, and create some presence in the Serb entity during elections.
- The other view is that a regular presence will jeopardize the safety of these troops, provide an attractive target for retaliation or hostage-taking, and increase the force requirements for IFOR.

What is the clear and defensible end-state that IFOR seeks to achieve before departing? (Q10, 29)

*The issue is what are the expectations for an end-state after one year of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot guarantee enduring peace, but we can give the parties a reasonable opportunity to consolidate peace within a finite period as a result of the military and civilian aspects of the implementation plan.*

*This issue requires further definition and refinement as the peace agreement takes shape and NATO planning proceeds.*

*The following is an initial list of possible milestones that we would hope to have reached by the end of the 12-month implementation period -- although their accomplishment would not be a precondition for IFOR's withdrawal at that time:*

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- UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;
- the entity boundary lines have been established, areas of separation and any cantonment areas have been marked and agreed to by the relevant parties;
- the parties' forces have withdrawn to their respective territories, to include adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use and reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment areas;
- the National Independent Electoral Commission, Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Joint Public Transportation corporation, and all civilian components of the peace implementation effort have been established and allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;
- elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local Parliaments have been completed and the Constitutional Structures are seated, to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.

Should we seek in the Framework Agreement a commitment that, after several months, the parties will be required to withdraw all their military forces (weapons and personnel) to specified cantonment areas?

*The issue is whether the peace agreement should require all military forces to pull back further than the zones of separation to enter cantonment areas as a confidence-building measure.*

- One view is that, if the parties cooperate, the peace agreement will be more easily enforceable, stability will be enhanced and fewer IFOR troops will be needed to implement the peace agreement.
- The other view is that, if the parties do not cooperate, more troops will be needed to enforce and monitor the cantonment areas, and evenhandedness may be jeopardized.

When do we have to give the order to preposition? What is the timing and sequence for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs? How much time between signing and deployment? What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When? (Q21, 22, 24, 26)

The attached notional timeline raises at least three issues:

- 1) How do we sequence the various international conferences?

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
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- 2) Will prepositioning of troops be undertaken before Congressional approval of the U.S. commitment of troops?
- 3) When is the appropriate time to go to Congress for approval of troop commitments?

What role should the U.S. play in seeking to establish civilian police and/or international police monitors? (Q6, 8)

As noted above, Deputies agree that IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions. The issue is whether the U.S. should take an active role in creating and/or strengthening a civilian police component (indigenous police and/or international police monitors).

- One view is that the U.S. should take an active role in developing a police force and monitors, with IFOR available as back-up in the case of major civil unrest. The supporting argument is that a viable civilian police component will relieve the pressures on IFOR and facilitate exit at the end of the 12-month period. It is further argued that without active U.S. leadership, the implementation effort (in particular, holding of elections and return of refugees) is unlikely to succeed.
- The other view is that it is sufficient for IFOR generally to provide a secure environment through the accomplishment of its primary tasks. For the U.S. to back up the developing police force will lead to assumption by IFOR of police functions throughout the country.



Samuel R. Berger  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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